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Abstract: For 15 years, former assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky used
his Penn State University perquisites to lure young and fatherless boys by
offering them special access to one of the most revered football programs in
the country. He repeatedly used the football locker room as a space to groom,
molest, and rape his victims. In February 2001, an eye-witness alerted Penn
State's top leaders that Sandusky was caught sexually assaulting a young boy
in the showers. Instead of taking swift action against Sandusky, leaders
began a cover-up that is considered one of the worst scandals in sports
history. While public outcry has focused on the leaders' silence, we focus on
the talk that occurred within the organization by key personnel. Drawing from
court documents and internal investigative reports, we examine two
euphemism clusters that unfolded in the scandal. The first cluster comprises
reporting euphemisms, in which personnel used coded language to report the
assault up the chain of command. The second cluster comprises responding
euphemisms, in which Penn State's top leaders relied on an innocuous, but
patently false, interpretation of earlier euphemisms as a decision-making
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framework to chart their course of (in)action. We use this case to
demonstrate how euphemistic language impairs ethical decision-making,
particularly by framing meaning and visibility of acts, encouraging mindless
processing of moral considerations, and providing a shield against
psychological and material consequences. Further, we argue that euphemism
may serve as a disguised retort to critical upward communication in
organizations.
Keywords: ambiguity, critical upward communication, decision-making,
ethics, euphemism, language, leadership, sexual abuse

In October 2012, former Penn State University assistant football
coach Jerry Sandusky was sentenced to 30 to 60 years behind bars for
the sexual abuse of ten boys (Levs & Dolan, 2012). Court reports show
that for 15 years, Sandusky used his Penn State perquisites to lure
young and fatherless boys by offering them tickets to football games,
travel to bowl games, and special access to one of the most revered
football programs in the country. He also used keys to the football
program's facilities—including the locker room—to access spaces
where he groomed, molested, and raped his victims. Although sexual
assault against children is heinous enough on its own accord, what
made the case arguably the worst scandal in sports history was the
decade-long organizational cover-up that ran concurrently with
Sandusky's pattern of abuse.
After the incidents of sexual assault came to light in November
2011, public outcry not only was directed against Sandusky, but also
against Penn State's top leaders: university president Graham Spanier,
senior vice president of finance and business Gary Schultz, athletic
director Timothy Curley, and legendary head football coach Joseph
Paterno. The central grievance was that these leaders were alerted to
Sandusky's reprehensible behavior, concealed the facts, quashed
proper criminal investigation, and protected the football program from
bad publicity instead of protecting innocent and vulnerable children
from further sexual abuse (Freeh, 2012). In fact, the cover-up, which
began in 1998, has been argued to be a contributing factor to the
prolonged nature of abuse and the expanded circle of Sandusky's
victims (Freeh, 2012; Moushey & Dvorchak, 2012).
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Much has been written already about the scandal: failures of
leadership (Candiotti, Levs, & Ariosto, 2012; Wolverton, 2012), an
organizational culture that privileged football over all else (Elvasky,
2012; Gregory & Webley, 2011), reliance on market values instead of
educational values for structuring decision-making (Giroux & Giroux,
2012; Proffitt & Corrigan, 2012), and a code of silence that protected
the university from bad publicity (Gutierrez & McLaren, 2012; Moushey
& Dvorchak, 2012). Throughout nearly all popular and scholarly
critiques, the question asked is, "Why didn't anyone speak up?" While
it is true that Penn State personnel did not communicate suspected
crimes to proper authorities, they were talking. What they were saying
and how they were saying it played a pivotal role in how the situation
unfolded, turning a "normal crime" into an organizational scandal
(Altheide & Johnson, 2012).
In this essay, we foreground organizational talk about the
accusations of abuse, focusing on language choices made by Penn
State personnel and the resultant ethical consequences. By language
choices, we refer to "discursive moves" that occur in several ways,
including deliberate planning to gain control over meaning making in a
particular context, spontaneous use of language that emerges through
dialogue over time, and intentional reuse of specific language from
previous emergent moves deemed successful (Moldoveanu, 2009).
Therefore, while we cannot make claims as to the intentionality of the
use of euphemism by Penn State personnel, we examine the ways in
which euphemism ultimately was embedded in its particular context
and functioned to shape reality and influence decision making (see
Larsson & Lundholm, 2010). Specifically, we draw from court
documents and investigative reports to trace how euphemistic
language was used throughout the case and ensuing cover-up. We
examine two euphemism clusters that unfolded in the scandal. The
first cluster comprises reporting euphemisms, in which personnel used
coded language to report the assault up the chain of command. The
second cluster comprises responding euphemisms, in which Penn
State's top leaders relied on an innocuous, but patently false,
interpretation of earlier euphemisms as a decision-making framework
to chart their course of (in)action. Ultimately, we assert that even
though the horrific acts that took place on Penn State's campus were
discussed internally, the interpersonal and organizational euphemisms
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used to report and respond to accusations of sexual abuse—
particularly the expression "horsing around"— impaired ethical
decision-making, particularly by framing meaning and visibility of acts,
encouraging mindless processing of moral considerations, and
providing a shield against psychological and material consequences.
We argue that euphemism may serve as a disguised retort to critical
upward communication in organizations.
This article is organized as follows. To begin, we provide
background on critical upward communication in organizations. From
there, we review relevant literature on euphemism and explain how
euphemism can contribute to making and justifying poor ethical
choices. Next, we explain the methods we used to build and analyze
the case. Then, we present our findings, starting with a brief summary
of the communicative history of the Penn State sexual abuse scandal.
We then expand on two main euphemism clusters: reporting
euphemisms, those used by eye witnesses to report up the chain of
command; and responding euphemisms, those used by key leaders
during the (in)action that followed in subsequent years of the coverup. Our findings offer important contributions to organizational
euphemism research and implications for business ethics practice.

Critical Upward Communication and Ethics
While managers may espouse their appreciation for feedback
from subordinates, that welcoming environment tends to apply more
to good news than bad. Tourish and Robson (2006) explain that the
prospect of sharing good news carries low-risk and high-reward.
Therefore, subordinates are encouraged to share positive news up the
chain of command and there is a strong upward flow of positive
information. However, the converse is true as well. When the
information a subordinate communicates is critical of management or
includes information, however factual, that is antithetical to
organizational goals or priorities, the message is far less well-received,
creating a situation where sharing it carries high-risk and low-reward.
Therefore, negative upward communication often is stifled and the flow
is weak. Tourish and Robson refer to negative information that is
transmitted by those without managerial power to those with such
power as critical upward communication.
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Research has shown that subordinates often are fearful of
engaging in critical upward communication, with some of the most
cited reasons for remaining silent being fear of being labeled as a
troublemaker, concern for ruining relationships, fear of being
punished, or concern about the organizational hierarchy or climate
(Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003). These concerns are not irrational.
Organizations often penalize employees or resort to other kinds of
behaviors that discourage employees from expressing dissent (Seeger
& Ulmer, 2003; Tourish & Robson, 2006; Waldron & Kassing, 2011).
But particularly in the case of problem-focused voice—which is an
employee's expression of concern about work practices, incidents, or
behaviors regarded as (potentially) harmful to the organization
(Morrison, 2011)—speaking up can be constructive and benefit an
organization in its decision-making.
When employees choose to share critical upward communication
(which can be viewed as a form of dissent; see Kassing, 2011), how
they express that information matters (Garner, 2012). Hierarchical
relationships and face-management needs have a strong influence on
how upward communication occurs in workplace settings. First, formal
command structures in organizations (e.g., hierarchical supervisorsubordinate relationships) prescribe certain expectations for the form
and content of communication (see Bisel, Messersmith, & Kelley,
2012), thereby fixing authority, acquiescence, and compliance (Bisel,
Kelley, Ploeger, & Messersmith, 2011). Also, because of the power the
supervisor holds over the subordinate, the stakes are higher for the
subordinate to protect the relationship. Second, communicators tend
to protect the face needs of conversational partners. In the case of
negative messages, face needs are heightened as the content of the
message typically are inherently face-threatening. But in the case of
negative messages that also carry ethical implications, the face threats
are heightened even further, as there may be an implied threat that
the recipient is unethical. Therefore, there is a tendency to prioritize
relationships by softening hurtful truths. A "moral mum effect" occurs
when a communicator avoids describing a behavior in ethical terms or
raising a moral objection to protect another's face needs (Bisel et al.,
2011) and a "hierarchical mum effect" occurs when a subordinate
engages in silence or equivocation in deference to a supervisor (Bisel
et al., 2012).
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More than simply softening the critical upward communication,
these mum effects have important consequences for ethics. While Bisel
et al. (2012) studied the ways in which subordinates failed to label
unethical requests from superiors as unethical, their findings have
import for critical upward communication that concerns ethical
problems, as ethical issues are one of the key issues subordinates
reported being unable to raise to superiors (Milliken et al., 2003). By
not drawing attention to ethical concerns within a critical message, it
creates a rhetorical absence that assigns a benign meaning to
something potentially unethical and creates barriers to morallyinformed decision making.

Euphemism and Ethics
At the outset, we note that our ethical position is informed by
deontology. Deontological ethics asserts agents are responsible to
uphold moral duties, including positive duties to do good and negative
duties to avoid doing harm. Particular to the Penn State sexual abuse
scandal, the ethical duties of the situation would be to take actions
that remove victims from harm's way and prevent future abuse, as
well as avoid actions that could put victims at further risk. While we
acknowledge the actions taken by Penn State's leaders to handle the
situation internally and not involve outside authorities could be viewed
as ethical under a different frame (e.g., ethical egoism is the belief
that agents should always act in their own best interest), in this article
we judge the ethicality of actions and language choices by the extent
to which they enabled and constrained the ability of agents to uphold
positive and negative moral duties to the children abused by
Sandusky.
Also, while we recognize that talk, decisions, and actions are not
the same thing—"to talk is one thing; to decide is a second; to act is
yet a third" (Brunsson, 2007, p.112), we take the view that language
provides a frame that influences how decisions are made and
ultimately what actions are taken or not taken. As Bisel and colleagues
(2011) asserted, communication is complicit in organizational ethics as
"communication itself is the behavior that imbues workplace (ethical or
unethical) behavior with value" (p. 154). In organizational contexts,
discursive moves shape realities for actors (Knights & Willmott, 1992;
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Larsson & Lundholm, 2010; see also speech act theory, Austin, 1962).
By foregrounding communication in our analysis, we recognize that
language is a basic ontological condition (see Ashcraft, Kuhn & Cooren,
2009; Bisel, 2010) necessary for producing social reality (Rorty, 1967)
and that actors draw upon established vocabularies when making
sense of events (Rorty, 1989; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).
Once organizational actors arrive at a consensually-constructed
meaning of a particular event, their shared meaning "serves as a
springboard to action" (Taylor & Van Every, 2000, p. 40). For our
purposes, we focus on euphemism as the shared vocabulary that was
drawn upon to make sense of accusations of abuse and coordinate
organizational activity in response.
Euphemism is one of the oldest and most recognizable forms of
language, having existed throughout human history (Allan & Burridge,
1991). Put simply, euphemism is "a word or phrase that is considered
a more polite manner of referring to a topic than its literal designation"
(McGlone, Beck, & Pfiester, 2006, p. 266). Common euphemisms in
everyday situations include "using the restroom" rather than
"urinating," and "he passed away" rather than "he died." In the
business world, ostensibly more gentle terms soften painful or
distasteful experiences: in job loss situations, managers describe the
process of "right sizing" instead of firing people; in corporations,
accountants speak of "pro forma financial statements" instead of
"making your own accounting rules" (Stein, 1998; Tenbrunsel &
Messick, 2004).
At a basic level, euphemism can serve positive ends. To begin, it
is one means by which communicators demonstrate contextdependent sensibility and tact tailoring messages to various audiences
(Fahnestock, 2011). Most frequently, inoffensive or pleasant terms are
substituted for topics that are considered taboo or stigmatized in
society—especially those related to sex, body parts, and bodily
functions (Slovenko, 2001, 2005). For instance, excusing oneself from
a dinner party to "use the restroom" is a polite way to omit unpleasant
details about the reason for the absence. Euphemism also serves the
purpose of minimizing face threat for speakers and their interlocutors
(McGlone & Batchelor, 2003). Because people who discuss taboo topics
run the risk of being negatively judged (e.g., impolite, inappropriate),
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they may mitigate some of that negative judgment by downplaying
their choice of topic with less offensive language (McGlone et al.,
2006). Likewise, euphemism can be used to avoid offending the
sensibilities of addressees, especially if they somehow are invoked by
or affected by a taboo topic. Finally, communicators can draw upon
euphemism to talk about unpleasant and unspeakable topics in ways
that they may not have been able to without such substitutes. For
example, in her study of Latina women's accounts of sexual violence in
a legal setting, Trinch (2001) found that women often do not use the
vivid word "rape" to describe what happened, but instead opt for
euphemistic terms that still are descriptive enough to define the act.
As such, euphemism holds the possibility of helping people to
overcome inhibitions of talking about unpleasant topics (McGlone et
al., 2006) and, therefore, open a space for dialogue.
But euphemism is not merely a polite form of talk; it is a
powerful language tool or "injurious weapon" (Bandura, 1999, p. 195)
that can have profound consequences (Stein, 1998). Euphemism can
alter the visibility and meaning of the phenomena it signifies—which
consequently can impede individuals from having full understanding of
the gravity and moral implications of a situation. It can function in a
metaphor-like fashion to frame personal and organizational decisionmaking, providing a way to short-circuit critical thinking and facilitate
mindless decision-making without regard to ethical implications
(Burgoon & Langer, 1995; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). It also can
provide a shield behind which individuals can justify and/or deny their
actions and silence reservations about moral wrongdoing (MacKenzie,
2000).

Changing Meanings and Visibility of the Signified
Euphemism raises ethical concerns because of its ability to cast
behaviors, deeds, and events in ways that provide more favorable
meanings. Given that euphemism is the replacement of repugnant
language with more neutral terms (Stein, 1998), it serves to reason
that euphemism can change the very meaning attached to the
phenomenon it is meant to signify. Bandura (1999) maintains that
"activities can take on very different appearances depending on what
they are called" (p. 195). For instance, managers who terminate
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employees are not cutting off paychecks and medical benefits without
notice; they are "right sizing" their organizations. Mortgage lenders
who sell subprime mortgages are not financially devastating families
who cannot afford home ownership; they are "helping people get a
piece of the American Dream" (for further discussion of several
common euphemisms, see Bandura, 1999). In this sense, euphemism
is more than just a face-saving way to broach an unpleasant act, but a
way to make the act itself less unpleasant (McGlone et al., 2006;
McGlone & Batchelor, 2003; Stein, 1998). Through euphemism,
distasteful activities can lose their repugnancy, harmful conduct can be
made respectable, and that which is socially unacceptable can be
transformed into something socially approved (Bandura, 1999; Stein,
1998). This kind of meaning-making is part of the rationale behind
McGlone et al.'s (2006) assertion that "we often use euphemisms to
tell it like it isn't" (p. 261).
In addition to changing the meaning of a signified event (i.e.,
how an event is seen), euphemism can alter its visibility (i.e., the
extent to which an event can be seen at all). Just as excusing oneself
to "use the restroom" makes invisible (or at least less visible) bodily
functions associated with that activity, euphemism has the power to
background, conceal, and mask a variety of different deeds and
behaviors (Stein, 1998). McGlone et al. (2006) describe euphemism as
camouflage, saying, "euphemism succeeds as a discourse strategy in
the same manner camouflage succeeds in its military mission—by
rendering its subject as inconspicuous as possible in the surrounding
context" (p. 263). Another way camouflaging alters the visibility of
certain events is by affecting the extent to which events are
remembered. McGlone et al. (2006) conducted a study that showed
that when conventional, familiar euphemisms are used to describe a
taboo event—as compared to describing the same event with an
unfamiliar euphemism or with a non-euphemistic, literal description—
subjects had a lower rate of recall for the taboo event. Put simply, it
was easier to forget an event when it was described in euphemistic
terms. It should not be surprising then that when euphemisms become
commonplace (e.g., "creative accounting," "right sizing"), people no
longer see the questionable behavior they were designed to disguise
(Stein, 1998). When euphemism conceals truth that ought not remain
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concealed, ethical problems arise (Gruner, Travillion, & Schaefer,
1991).

Framing Action and Encouraging Mindless DecisionMaking
Language is a central mechanism for framing thinking, action,
and decision-making (Bandura, 1999). Stein (1998) argues that
euphemism "is as much a hard fact in decision making as are hard
numbers" (p. 4). Euphemism can be a catalyst for unethical decisionmaking as it can hide ethical concerns, encourage mindless processing
of decisions, and then commit those decisions into institutional
memory, setting precedent for future (unethical) decisions to be made.
As described above, euphemism can alter the meaning and
visibility of situations in such a way that ethical considerations are
hidden from view. When this kind of reframing or sanitizing occurs,
"we avoid the complexity inherent in ethical dilemmas and short-circuit
our decision-making process" (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004, p. 228).
Commonplace expressions, such as euphemism, can trigger
mindlessness (see Burgoon & Langer, 1995) and consequently
decrease the quality and ethicality of decision-making. Instead of
making thoughtful decisions marked by careful deliberation of ethical
considerations and moral responsibilities, decision makers rely on
heuristic reasoning, snap judgments, and/or generalizations (Burgoon
& Langer, 1995; McGlone et al., 2006). Furthermore, as decisions
become highly routinized based on past practices in organizations and
organizational members become psychologically numbed by repetition
of words, phrases, and the meanings and actions they generate, the
propensity for critical evaluation and thoughtful deliberation decreases
even further. Mindless decision-making processes can get entrenched
even deeper as euphemism-laced accounts become commonplace and
unethical practices become "thoughtlessly routinized" (Bandura, 1999,
p. 203).

Providing a Shield for One's Actions
Just as euphemism can be used as a framework to make
decisions, it also can be used as a way to justify and/or deny decisions
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already made or actions already taken. When unethical action already
has occurred, euphemism provides a shield to protect individuals from
the psychological consequences of those actions. Instead of
acknowledging the possibility that an individual is not an ethical
person, dealing with a host of negative emotions for having done
wrong, and/or exposing oneself to repercussions for unethical
decision-making, euphemism can be used to distance people from the
role they played in immoral conduct and attempt to reduce personal
responsibility for that action (Bandura, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Messick,
2004).
Stein (1998) explains that when unethical actions are taken,
"things cannot and must not be called, or felt, what they are. To do so
would bring on overwhelming guilt, anxiety, and remorse" (p. 30).
Therefore, there is a tendency for individuals to engage in selfdeception—a lack of awareness or acknowledgement that one is
behaving unethically—as a way to reduce the dissonance experienced
when there is a disconnect between their actions and identity
(MacKenzie, 2000; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Tenbrunsel and
Messick (2004) coin the term "ethical fading" to describe the
psychological process by which ethical decisions are "bleached" of their
moral implications, and outline the role of euphemisms in this process.
Euphemism, by reframing meaning in more favorable terms or by
rendering the ethics of the act invisible, function as an "ethical bleach"
that washes out ethical implications. In this way, euphemisms act as
"powerful tricksters" and "disguised stories" that can shield people
from the motives for and consequences of their own actions (Stein,
1998; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). MacKenzie (2000) points to a
dramatic example of this phenomenon. Adolph Eichmann, a key leader
in the Holocaust, portrayed himself as innocent through the use of
euphemisms. He drew heavily from the Third Reich's Language Rules,
"which were the required use of euphemisms and code terms for
killings and brutalities" (MacKenzie, 2000, p. 32). This example points
to the utility of euphemism for recasting a narrative that is voided of
ethical concerns and, once a narrative is neutralized, for distancing
oneself psychologically from the consequences of actions and
decisions.
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In addition to psychological protection, euphemism also can act
as a shield against material consequences of one's actions and
decisions. Euphemisms, by their very nature, are ambiguous
expressions. Whereas ambiguity can serve positive purposes (e.g.,
creating a space for unified diversity; see Eisenberg, 1984), it also can
serve unethical ends. In particular, ambiguity created by euphemism
can be used to escape blame, avoid responsibility, and create plausible
deniability (Paul & Strbiak, 1997). For instance, plausible deniability
makes it much more difficult to meet requirements for establishing
burden of proof (Walton, 1996), which can dramatically influence
outcomes of court cases. Regardless of whether the meaning of a
signified phenomenon is understood, individuals can feign ignorance of
a given situation by claiming they relied on alternative meanings of the
euphemism in question. In this regard, people who have engaged in
unethical behavior can be protected from material consequences such
as criminal and civil liability and, therefore, not have to be held
accountable for unethical actions.
In sum, euphemism can serve unethical, if not downright
dangerous, ends. Euphemism has been described as exerting "a
corrosive influence on communicative clarity" (McGlone et al., 2006, p.
276). In organizations, "bureaucratic-style euphemisms" are
considered a form of deceptive organizational communication, which
conceal or neutralize embarrassing and/or unpleasant deeds in
attempts at "willful perversion of the truth" (Redding, 1996, p. 30).
Euphemism can be used to reframe less-than-desirable phenomena as
socially acceptable, to render ethical concerns invisible, to encourage
mindless decision-making, and to justify and/or deny ethically
questionable actions. It should not be surprising then that euphemism
has been described as an "injurious weapon" (Bandura, 1999, p. 195)
and a "form of violence" (Stein, 1998, p. 7). The injury and violence
that can be leveraged by euphemism is vividly illustrated in the Penn
State sexual abuse scandal, throughout which Penn State personnel
reported and responded to accusations of child sexual abuse with
euphemistic language.
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Method
In this essay, we present a narrative of Penn State's internal
communication that unfolded surrounding the Sandusky scandal. While
there have been countless news reports and opinion pieces on the
scandal—many of which have suggested evidence of an organizational
cover-up—we base our analysis on the texts that most closely
represent the original communicative exchanges between key
personnel. These include the grand jury presentments which comprise
summary testimony from victims, witnesses, and Penn State personnel
called to testify, released in November 2011 (GJ1-2); Centre County
court transcripts from Sandusky's criminal hearing in June 2012 (CC1CC11); and Dauphin County court transcripts from Schultz and
Curley's combined preliminary hearing on perjury and failure to report
charges from December 2011 (DC). We also analyzed the Freeh
Report, which is the 267-page commissioned investigative report
released in July 2012 (FR), which includes copies of emails, meeting
notes, handwritten notes between university leaders, typewritten
correspondence, and other internal communication. In total, we
combed through more than 2,500 pages of reports and transcripts.
See Table 1 for complete citations of documents quoted in the
analysis.
Also, given that Paterno testified in court only once before his
death in January 2012, we turn to his posthumously published
biography, Paterno (Posnanski, 2012), to provide further detail of what
he may have said or heard about reports of sexual abuse by
Sandusky. Because biographies present subjective and personal
accounts of experiences (Schwandt, 2007), we took special precaution
in drawing from Paterno's biography as a data source. We included in
our case analysis only Paterno's recollections of his conversation with
McQueary and excluded any of Posnanski's interpretation or personal
insights that extended beyond the scope of Paterno's conversations
with Penn State personnel. Given the brief conversations reported by
Posnanski are consistent with Paterno's testimony to the grand jury,
we judged the information as trustworthy.
The first phase of analysis was identifying the core data to be
analyzed. We began this process by reading the documents in their

Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 114, No. 4 (June 2013): pg. 551-569. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer.

13

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

entirety to gain a holistic sense of the case—including the entirety of
the criminal proceedings against Sandusky. Then, we uploaded the
documents into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software program
that aids in data coding and retrieval (Weitzman & Miles, 1995) and
can be used as a tool for data reduction. In this step, we winnowed the
data (Wolcott, 1994) by coding each passage that represented a
communicative exchange involving Penn State personnel, including
codes for details such as parties involved, communication channel, and
content of message. We paid particular attention to recollections of
conversations between personnel, email messages, and other internal
written records. The winnowing process significantly reduced the data
by removing the bulk of testimony surrounding details of the sexual
assaults, leaving a condensed dataset centered on Penn State's
internal communication.
The next major phase of the analysis was building a timeordered display matrix (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Because of the flow
of court proceedings, the chronology of events is not readily apparent
simply by reading transcripts. For instance, a single witness typically
provides initial testimony, is cross-examined, and then responds to a
redirect. In each segment of questioning, events can be addressed
multiple times and out of sequence. Additional witnesses each have a
turn addressing the same sequence of events or different events that
occurred before, during, and/or after other events previously described
in testimony. Therefore, there is a "circling-back" pattern to testimony
that creates overlapping and out-of-sequence timeline segments.
Likewise, the organization of the Freeh Report was ordered in such a
way that many of the appendices (including copies of internal
communication) were not presented in chronological order.
Furthermore, sources revealed unique information about different
communicative exchanges, requiring that evidence be merged from
multiple sources into a single timeline. Therefore, we reorganized all
coded passages from all sources into a matrix that was ordered by
date of occurrence and listed all details (quotations, communicators,
citation information) for each utterance.
The final phase of analysis involved analyzing the time-ordered
display as a text. We read through the data looking for patterns in the
communicative exchanges. This process involved iterative processes of
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coding for deeper meaning (e.g., recurrent phrases, emotional states)
and theoretical memoing that captured impressions and established
connections between codes (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). We also
contextualized the data by returning to original sources to gather
additional details surrounding exchanges. Following the outline
provided by time-ordered display and in light of the key findings of our
language-based analysis, we reconstruct the case below, framing the
retelling with a particular focus on the communicative handling of the
case rather than the abuse itself.
As a caveat, we must note that because the accounts presented
here are drawn primarily from court transcripts, the accuracy of these
recollections is debatable—especially considering that Curley, Schultz,
and Spanier are facing charges of perjury. Additionally, some of the
language used throughout the hearings likely resulted from coaching
by attorneys (both for the prosecution and defense) and/or the
language culture of the courtroom; likewise, some of language used in
the unfolding of the case may have resulted from advice by university
counsel.1 Yet, there appears to be striking agreement between parties
about the essence of what was said and not said, particularly in regard
to the euphemisms favored by all parties. While we cannot speculate
on what language was shaped by the legal system, we do compensate
for the limitation of retrospective accounts by presenting all available
recollections of specific conversations.

A Communicative History of the Penn State Scandal
The grand jury presentments and criminal trial testimony
against Jerry Sandusky contain lurid and heart-wrenching details of
more than a decade of sexual assaults against young boys, many of
which occurred on Penn State's campus and/or in association with the
school's football program. The point of this essay is not to rehearse the
charges of abuse, but instead to show how key leaders in the Penn
State system communicated about the abuse of which they were
aware. Based on court testimony and the independent investigation,
there are three known incidents that came to the attention of Penn
State staff and administrators. In May 1998, a woman reported to
Penn State police department that Sandusky had showered with her
11 year-old son and touched him inappropriately (i.e., hugging and
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lifting him up while both were naked). A campus police investigation
was launched, but no formal charges were filed (FR, pp. 41-47). In fall
2000, janitor Jim Calhoun relayed to coworkers that he had witnessed
Sandusky performing oral sex on a young boy in the showers. At the
time, coworkers convinced Calhoun not to report the abuse up the
chain of command for fear that they would lose their jobs (FR, pp. 6566). Then, on February 9, 2001, graduate assistant Michael McQueary
witnessed Sandusky sexually assaulting a young boy in the football
locker room. His reporting of the incident to Paterno, and eventually to
Curley and Schultz, initiated a chain of (in)action that is at the center
of the trials. Therefore, it is communication about this third incident
that is the focus of our analysis.

Horsing Around: Euphemism and Inaction at Penn
State
One of the key contentions throughout the criminal trials is the
extent to which Penn State leaders knew about what happened in the
showers. While it is agreed by all parties that McQueary had reported
some sort of incident, there is debate as to what exactly he had
reported. The interpretations range from McQueary's account of sexual
intercourse with a minor to Curley, Schultz, and Spanier's account of
Sandusky simply "horsing around." Below, we trace the evolution of
euphemisms up the chain of command and then ultimately used by
Penn State's top leaders to chart their course of (in)action.
There were two central euphemism clusters. The first cluster of
reporting euphemisms was used to describe the sexual assault
witnessed by McQueary and how his observation was reported to Penn
State leaders. The second cluster of responding euphemisms deals
with language used by Curley, Schultz, and Spanier in their
organizational response to disciplining Sandusky and deciding not to
report to authorities for further action, but instead to bar "guests"
from using university facilities. See Table 2 for a summary. Here, we
provide more detail of the sequence of events by examining the
specific language used in the reporting. Euphemisms are marked in
italics and should not be interpreted as emphasis of text, unless
specifically noted.
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Reporting Euphemisms: Moving Bad News Up the Chain
of Command
In February 2001, McQueary entered the Penn State football
locker room late on a Friday night. According to court testimony he
instantly was alerted to the presence of other people by the sounds of
running water and "skin-on-skin smacking sounds" (CC4, p. 192).
Although flustered, he looked into the showers and witnessed "Coach
Sandusky's arms wrapped around the boy's midsection in the very,
very, very—the closest proximity that I think you could be in" (CC4,
pp. 193-194). He slammed his locker door shut as loudly as possible to
alert Sandusky to his presence and in an attempt to communicate
"Someone is here. Break it up. Please" (CC4, p. 198). McQueary and
Sandusky made direct eye contact, but McQueary said nothing to him.
Instead, he promptly left the locker room and retreated to his personal
office on another floor of the building to call his father, John
McQueary, for advice on how to proceed.
Because McQueary said nothing to Sandusky, the first actual
talk about the shower incident occurred when McQueary spoke with his
father by phone. When asked by his father what was wrong, McQueary
provided an emotional and euphemistic response. John McQueary
recounted the conversation this way:
He says, "I saw Coach Sandusky in the shower with a little boy."
He says, "first I heard it and," he said, "I knew that something
was going wrong." And he said, "I followed—looked into the
locker room and saw him there with a little boy." (DC, pp. 143)
McQueary drove to his father's home that evening where he further
discussed the incident with his father and a family friend, Jonathan
Dranov. McQueary's account of his discussion with his father reflected
nearly identical euphemistic language: "I said I just saw Coach
Sandusky in the showers with a boy and what I saw was wrong and
sexual." In both accounts, the actual words were "in the shower[s]
with a boy." While it may be inferred that there was something sexual
occurring (and McQueary's testimony claims that he used the word
sexual), "with a boy" is euphemistic and leaves much room for
ambiguity; the only thing unequivocal was that Sandusky was not
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alone. Being "with" someone could be purely innocent (e.g., an adult
and child showering after a workout), predatory (as McQueary testified
in court), or anywhere in between.
McQueary was advised by his father to contact Paterno and
report the incident. The following morning, McQueary called Paterno at
home and told him he had something important to tell him. Paterno
initially attempted to halt communication, saying, "I don't have a job
for you. And if that's what it's about, don't bother coming over." When
McQueary assured him that it was not about a job, Paterno relented.
McQueary drove to Paterno's home, where he relayed to Paterno in a
10-minute conversation what he had witnessed the night before.
Paterno's recollection of the conversation was retold by his biographer:
"Paterno remembered McQueary's nervousness more vividly than
anything else. He remembered telling McQueary more than once to
calm down as they sat at the kitchen table, McQueary had a hard time
catching his breath" (Posnanski, 2012, p. 271). Whether it was
because of the emotionality of witnessing an assault, the fear of
reporting bad news upward, or the face threat involved in discussing a
taboo topic, McQueary was not very direct. McQueary's recollection of
the words he relayed to the coach were similar to those he shared with
his father: "[I said] I had saw Jerry with a young boy in the shower
and that it was way over the lines" (DC, p. 24).
Again, McQueary's language was euphemistic. But he assumed
that its meaning was clear. "I had told him—and I want to make sure
I'm clear—I told him what I had seen, again, on the surface. I made
sure he knew it was sexual and that it was wrong, and there was no
doubt about that. I did not go into gross detail about the actual act"
[emphasis added] (CC4, p. 205). But while McQueary testified that he
has "no doubt" (CC4, p. 205) he saw Sandusky engaged in intercourse
with the young boy, those were not the words he used. His intent to
make sure Paterno "knew it was wrong" did not match his tentative
and ambiguous language choices. McQueary explained, "I didn't feel
comfortable using those terms ["anal sex"] and I didn't explain those
details or use those terms in talking with those men [Paterno, John
McQueary] out of respect and probably my own embarrassment, to be
frank with you" (CC4, pp. 205-206). Repeatedly, McQueary
emphasized that it was respect for Paterno that caused him to dilute
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his language choices—even though he believed Paterno "needed" and
"deserved" to know about the assault. McQueary says, "Out of respect
and just not getting into detail with someone like Coach Paterno. I
would not have done it" (DC, p. 25). When pressed further, McQueary
still held to the belief that it was better to be euphemistic than clear.
For example, when asked whether he used the term "anal
intercourse," McQueary said, "I gave a brief description of what I saw.
You don't—ma'am—you don't go to Coach Paterno or at least in my
mind I don't go to Coach Paterno and go into great detail of sexual
acts. I would have never done that with him ever" (DC, pp. 73-74). In
cross-examination, McQueary admitted to avoiding less ambiguous
terms including "sodomy," "anal intercourse," "anal sodomy," "anal,"
"anal sex," "crime," "assault," "rape," or "intercourse" (DC, pp. 25, 7172, 102). He qualified the specificity of his report, saying that he
"probably used the word sexual" [emphasis added] (DC, p. 102).
Despite his use of euphemism and avoidance of more direct language,
McQueary insisted that Paterno understood it was sexual in nature.
Paterno claimed otherwise. In his grand jury testimony, Paterno
relayed his understanding of the report, saying, "Well, he had seen a
person, an older—not an older, but a mature person who was fondling,
whatever you might call it—I'm not sure what the term would be—a
young boy" (DC, p. 175). When asked if "fondling" was the actual term
used, Paterno revealed the ambiguous nature of McQueary's account:
"Well, I don't know what you would call it. Obviously, he [Sandusky]
was doing something with the youngster. It was a sexual nature. I'm
not sure exactly what it was" (DC, p. 175). Despite not understanding
what McQueary was reporting (i.e., fondling and raping are different
acts), Paterno did nothing to clarify his understanding because of the
discomfort of the situation. In his grand jury testimony, he explained:
I didn't push Mike to describe exactly what it was because he
was very upset. Obviously, I was in a little bit of a dilemma
since Mr. Sandusky was not working for me anymore. So I
told—I didn't go any further than that except I knew Mike was
upset and I knew some kind of inappropriate action was being
taken by Jerry Sandusky with a youngster. (DC, pp. 175-176)
Speaking to his biographer, Paterno discussed what he took away from
the conversation. He said, "I thought he saw them horsing around.
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Maybe he thought he saw some fondling. I don't know about any of
this stuff." (Posnanski, 2012, p. 272). Instead of trying to ascertain
exactly what McQueary had witnessed, verifying whether a young boy
was indeed fondled (or raped, as McQueary's court room testimony
indicates) in a locker room, or demanding that McQueary be more
direct in his report, Paterno responded by simply stopping the
conversation. Paterno said, "I told him he didn't have to tell me
anything else" (Posnanski, 2012, p. 272) and "You did what was right;
you told me" (DC, p. 176). The conversation ended when Paterno
thanked McQueary for reporting what he had witnessed and promised
him that he would take care of it.
The next step in the chain of command for reporting the assault
fell to Paterno. Sometime that weekend, Paterno contacted athletic
director Curley, and arranged a meeting for Sunday, February 11, in
which he informed Curley and vice president Schultz of McQueary's
report. Paterno recalled his initial report to Curley: "I called him and I
said, 'hey, we got a problem,' and I explained the problem to him"
(DC, p. 177). Paterno was not asked to recount to the grand jury
exactly how he described the "problem," but instead simply agreed
that he "passed along substantially the same information that Mr.
McQueary had given" him (DC, p. 177). Schultz recalled the
conversation this way: "He indicated that someone observed some
behavior in the football locker room that was disturbing" (DC, p. 206).
Curley described the encounter with Paterno being a face-to-face
meeting with Paterno, Curley, and Schultz. According to Curley,
Paterno reported that an assistant football coach went into the locker
room in the evening and that "the individual heard and saw, I guess,
two people in the shower, in the shower area… He was uncomfortable
with that and at that point he felt it was something he should report to
Coach Paterno. Coach Paterno relayed that information to Gary
[Schultz] and I" (DC, p. 181). Curley's use of "two people in the
shower" camouflages any suspicion of sexual assault. As further
evidence of the invisibility of euphemism, the attorney (for the
prosecution) seemed satisfied with Curley's vague response and did
not ask him to elaborate any further.
Yet, Curley and Schultz must have understood the coded,
euphemistic language to be something more insidious than two people
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simply showering together. On Sunday, February 11, shortly after
hearing Paterno's second-hand account, Schultz contacted attorney
Wendell Courtney—who was the independent legal counsel for Penn
State and The Second Mile (the nonprofit organization for
underprivileged youth, of which Sandusky was the founder)—to seek
counsel on "reporting of suspected child abuse" (FR, Exhibit 5A). Then
the following day, Monday, Schultz and Curley called a "heads up"
meeting with Spanier to alert him of the situation. Spanier said in a
prepared written statement, "The report was that Jerry Sandusky was
seen in an athletic locker room facility showering with one of his
Second Mile youth, after a workout, and that they were "horsing
around" (or "engaged in horseplay")" (FR, Exhibit 2J).
Spanier asserted that he asked two follow-up questions: "are
you sure that is how it was described to you, as horsing around?" and
"are you sure that that is all that was reported?" (FR, Exhibit 2J). Even
though Spanier is being charged with perjury and this particular
statement is a key point of contention, it is indeed plausible that
Curley and Schultz reported someone had witnessed Sandusky
"horsing around" with another young boy in the shower. Spanier's
response is suggests a desire to hide behind coded, euphemistic
language. Instead of asking questions to clarify (e.g., "What do you
mean "horsing around"? "If all that happened is innocent 'horsing
around,' why are you telling me about it?" "What other details were
reported?"), Spanier accepted the euphemism for its most innocuous
meaning.
Curley and Schultz also scheduled a meeting with McQueary to
hear his account of the event directly. In the estimated 15-minute
meeting, which was held approximately February 20, McQueary
claimed, "I told them that I saw Jerry in the showers with a young boy
and that what I had seen was extremely sexual and over the lines and
it was wrong" (DC, p. 32). When pressed further, McQueary said, "I
would have said that Jerry was in there in very close proximity behind
a young boy with his arms wrapped around him…. I would have said I
heard slapping sounds…. I would have made it clear that it was in the
shower and they were naked" (DC, pp. 33-34). Although McQueary
was clear in his testimony—at least in regard to what he would have
said (his peculiar phrasing "I would have said," which is not typical of
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how he talked in the rest of his testimony, raises some doubts as to
whether he actually vocalized some of the details)—he equivocated
about his language choices. "Again, I would not have used some of the
words that you previously mentioned ["sodomy," "anal intercourse"],
but I would have described that it was extremely sexual and that I
thought that some kind of intercourse was going on" (DC, p. 34).
Curley's account of McQueary's side of the story was quite
different. He said, "My recollection was that Mike could hear there
were people in, they were in the shower area, that they were horsing
around, that they were playful, and that it just did not feel
appropriate" (DC, p. 183). He continued to paint a picture of behavior
that, while perhaps immature, was not sexual. In fact, when asked if
the conduct reported was that of a sexual nature, Curley flatly denied
that McQueary reported "any kind" of sexual contact (DC, p. 184).
Instead he replied, "My recollection was that they were kind of
wrestling, there was body contact, and they were horsing around" (DC,
p. 184). In comparison, Schultz said of the same conversation, "I
believe that he said that he saw something that he felt was
inappropriate between Jerry and a boy" (DC, p. 226). He, too, denied
explicit claims of sexual abuse had been made by McQueary, asserting
that the reports received by both Paterno and McQueary were very
general and lacking details. Schultz claimed that he concluded from
the meeting with McQueary that "I had the impression that it was
inappropriate…. I had the feeling that there was perhaps some kind of
wrestling around activity and maybe Jerry might have grabbed the
young boy's genitals or something of that sort is kind of the impression
that I had" (DC, p. 211). Even though he acknowledged that there
may have been genital contact, Schultz denied there were sexual
overtones. Instead, he chocked it up to Sandusky's tendency to be a
clown and "the kind of horsing around that he does" (DC, p. 226):
You know, I don't know what sexual conduct's definition to be,
but I told you that my impression was—you know, Jerry was the
kind of guy that he regularly kind of like physically wrestled
people. He would punch you in the arm. He would slap you on
the back. He would grab you and get you in a headlock, etc.
That was a fairly common clowning around thing. I had the
impression that maybe something like that was going on in the
locker room and perhaps in the course of that, that somebody
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might have grabbed the genitals, that Jerry might have grabbed
the genitals of the young boy. I had no impression that it was
anything more serious than that. That was my impression at the
time. (DC, p. 223-224)
The meeting between the three men was brief. Despite calling
McQueary in for the specific purpose of learning what he saw, there
was no indication that Curley and Schultz took the matter seriously. All
parties involved—McQueary, Schultz, and Curley—agreed that
euphemistic language ruled the encounter. Specifically, Schultz and
Curley allowed McQueary's euphemistic language to go unchecked.
They did not ask perception-checking questions to confirm their
personal assessments of the situation. And most troubling of all,
Schultz got an impression from talking to McQueary that Sandusky
may have touched a boy's genitals, but did not seek more information
from the very eye witness who could have given the necessary insight
to help them determine the best course of action. Instead, Penn
State's top leaders concluded the meeting by reassuring McQueary
that "they thought it was serious, what I was saying, and that they
would investigate it or look into it closely, and they said they would
follow-up with me" (DC, p. 35).
Throughout the reporting of sexual abuse, all parties appeared
threatened by the details they had to reveal. As a result, rather than
speaking plainly and unequivocally about accusations of abuse, Penn
State personnel relied on the euphemism "horsing around," a
seemingly innocent term denoting rough or boisterous play. Notably, it
is not fully clear how or when the euphemism first emerged—or who
was the first to utter the expression. While the first record in court
testimony and investigative reports indicates its appearance at the
February 12 meeting when Curley and Schultz first reported to Spanier
that Sandusky was caught "horsing around" or "engaged in horseplay,"
it is conceivable that Paterno was the individual responsible for
introducing the euphemism. Paterno recounted to his biographer that
he concluded after his meeting with McQueary on February 10 that he
thought that McQueary saw Sandusky and a child "horsing around."
Given the vague testimony Paterno later provided in court with regard
to the words he used to report to his superiors (i.e., he simply agreed
that he reported basically the same information McQueary had given
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him), perhaps "horsing around" had taken hold prior to its first
officially recorded use.
Regardless, by the time the Curley and Schultz went back to
McQueary for a first-hand account of what happened, they were no
longer looking to learn what had happened. They simply were seeking
confirmation of their euphemism "horsing around" and its most
innocuous possible interpretation. The course of (in)action that was
already being put into place was dependent upon that shared
interpretation—or at least a plausible account of that shared
interpretation, which functioned as a sensemaking vocabulary for
understanding the events (see Rorty, 1989; Weick et al., 2005). Then,
absent any unvarnished and unambiguous details from McQueary,
Curley and Schultz had the wiggle room necessary to claim their
preferred meaning of the euphemism and chart their course of action.

Responding Euphemisms: Leaders Determining Course
of (In)Action
A second cluster of euphemisms used throughout the
organizational response was just as problematic as the euphemisms
used to describe the sexual assault itself. Following the initial reporting
of the sexual assault by Curley and Schultz to Spanier on February 12,
the three leaders held a follow-up meeting on February 25, in which
handwritten notes indicated a course of action was decided. The action
plan included informing the chair of The Second Mile, reporting to the
Department of Welfare, and "Tell[ing] J.S. to avoid bringing children
alone into Lasch Bldg" (FR, Exhibit 5E). A follow-up email written on
February 26 by Schultz to Curley and Spanier reiterated the basic plan,
stating the need to "talk with the subject [Sandusky] ASAP regarding
the future appropriate use of the University facility" (FR, Exhibit 5E).
On February 27, Curley responded to Schultz and Spanier,
indicating that he talked with Paterno and proposed a different course
of action that struck external reporting from the plan. He said:
I am uncomfortable with what we agreed were the next steps. I
am having trouble with going to everyone, but the person
involved [Sandusky]. I think I would be more comfortable
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meeting with the person and tell him about the information we
received….I will let him know that his guests are not permitted
to use our facilities. (FR, Exhibit 5G)
Curley's hesitancy to communicate the accusation to external
organizations (which have power over Penn State leaders), is akin to
the hesitancy that subordinates may experience in reporting critical
upward communication. Spanier agreed with Curley's assessment and
empathized with his discomfort. He endorsed Curley's new plan,
saying, "It [the revised plan] requires you to go a step further and
means that your conversation will be all the more difficult, but I
admire your willingness to do that and I am supportive" (FR, Exhibit
5G). Schultz endorsed the plan as well.
In his prepared written statement, Spanier described reiterated the
preferred euphemistic language proposed by Curley:
I asked that Tim [Curley] meet with Sandusky to tell him that
he must never again bring youth into the showers. We further
agreed that we should inform the Second Mile president that we
were directing Jerry accordingly and furthermore that we did not
wish Second Mile youth to be in our showers. (FR, Exhibit 2J)
Schultz also used the pervasive euphemism that emphasized proper
use of facilities, saying, "I think we decided it would be appropriate to
just say to Jerry that you shouldn't be bringing the Second Mile kids
onto campus in the football building" (DC, p. 212).
One of the critiques launched by the Freeh Report was that
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier used "generic references" and "code"
words in their emails when discussing the Sandusky incident (FR, p.
73). But what is particularly striking about their euphemistic language
is not just that it was vague (i.e., avoiding putting specific details into
writing, including names), but that their particular choice of
euphemism removed any suggestion of criminal activity and radically
shifted the frame of culpability. Whereas McQueary's report of sexual
assault in euphemistic terms (e.g., "with a boy", "over the lines") may
have obfuscated the criminality and severity of what he had witnessed,
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier's euphemistic language shifted the
wrongdoing from Sandusky assaulting young children (on campus and
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elsewhere) to improper use of university facilities. The problem was
reframed as Sandusky bringing "children alone into the Lasch
Building," Sandusky not engaging in "appropriate use of the University
facility," and his "guests" gaining unauthorized access to facilities.
Additionally, these euphemisms removed any remaining
attention away from the victim and his needs for protection and
support. Their choice of words rebranded Sandusky's victim as a
guest—and an unauthorized one at that—who took advantage of Penn
State football facilities. In this way, the boy was a conspirator
alongside Sandusky. The boy did not pay an admission fee to use the
equipment and could potentially be seen at greater fault because he,
unlike Sandusky, was not an authorized user of the facility. Moreover,
talking about Sandusky's "guests" and "children," both in the plural,
further anonymized the victim from the night of February 9, 2001. The
boy no longer was a particular victim who had to be identified and
helped, but one of many possible "freeloaders" who had to be stopped
from gaining a benefit not due to them. In effect, the euphemism
positioned Penn State University as the party being put at risk and/or
harmed.
The meeting between Curley and Sandusky was scheduled for
March 5, nearly a full month after McQueary initially reported the
assault. In court testimony, Curley recalled his conversation with
Sandusky:
When I met with Jerry, because I was uncomfortable with the
information we received, I indicated to him that in addition to
reporting it to the executive director of the Second Mile, that I
did not want him using our athletic facilities for workout
purposes and bringing any young people with him. He was not
to use our facilities with young people." (DC, p. 186)
Penn State's General Counsel's notes from a March 2011 conversation
with Spanier reflect that Spanier "[b]umped into Tim Curley and Tim
advised that he had a conversation with Sandusky not to bring children
into the shower again" (FR, p. 77).
There were two elements of the response were particularly
troubling. First, the mandate to Sandusky was not to stop sexually
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abusing children, but to stop "showering with" them or "using our
athletic facilities for workout purposes." Again, as it is presented, the
problem is framed as Sandusky and his guests taking unfair advantage
of Penn State facilities. The euphemism camouflaged the real reason
behind the prohibition and removed ethical judgment from the
situation. Second, there was a lack of urgency in disciplining Sandusky
that can be traced back to euphemism. If the problem was that
Sandusky's "horsing around" could be putting himself and/or a child at
risk of a slip and fall accident, it was an issue that could have been
handled properly with low urgency and a casual meeting. If the
problem was that Sandusky was inviting his "guests" to "use"
university facilities in an inappropriate and unauthorized way, it was
an issue that could have been handled properly with low urgency and a
casual meeting—or avoided altogether if deemed there was not
enough harm to the university to warrant addressing the problem. But
the real issue was that Sandusky was sexually abusing boys on Penn
State property. Therefore, it was an issue that required immediate,
decisive action and required reporting to outside authorities for further
investigation
Furthermore, the proposed prohibition was highly ineffectual.
Because of the euphemistic language of not "bringing children to the
shower" and intentionally circumventing any mention of sexual abuse,
there was no way to create a common understanding or communicate
the gravity of the prohibition. The order was not truly enforceable as
only Sandusky and a few administrators who rarely, if ever, were in
the football facilities were aware of the prohibition. Individuals who
could have helped to enforce the ban (e.g., janitors, assistant coaches,
other athletics staff) were not informed of it. Schultz described the
enforcement mechanism as the "honor system" and said that Curley
trusted Sandusky to obey the request (DC, p. 234).
Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the euphemisms
favored by Curley, Schultz, and Spanier were lost on Sandusky.
According to Sandusky's attorney, Curley and Sandusky had a
conversation in which they discussed the prohibition on taking children
into the showers on campus:
Sandusky's counsel said Curley told Sandusky that they had
heard Sandusky had been in the shower with a young child, and
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someone felt this was inappropriate. According to Sandusky's
counsel, Curley never used the word "sex" or "intercourse"
during the discussion. Counsel said Sandusky offered to give the
child's name to Curley, but Curley did not accept this invitation.
Counsel also said Curley told Sandusky he did not want
Sandusky to bring children to the shower any more. Sandusky's
counsel said no one accused Sandusky of abusing kids. (FR, p.
77)
In a final step, Curley met with The Second Mile executive
director Jack Raykovitz sometime in March. In that meeting, Curley
reported that someone had seen Sandusky in the locker room with a
young boy and was "uncomfortable" with the situation. Curley told
Raykovitz that he had discussed the incident with Sandusky and
determined that nothing inappropriate had occurred that that it was a
"non-issue;" however, to avoid the risk of bad publicity, Sandusky
would no longer be permitted to bring children onto the Penn State
campus. Curley asked Raykovitz to emphasize the prohibition to
Sandusky (FR, pp. 64, 78). Yet, when Raykovitz repeated the
prohibition of bringing children on campus, Sandusky retorted that it
applied only to the locker rooms (FR, p. 78).
Contrary to the original plan that proposed making an official
report to the Department of Public Welfare (and in opposition to state
law that mandates reporting of suspected child abuse to law
enforcement; see Cons. Stat. Tit. 23, § 6311), no additional reports
were made by Penn State leaders and, for all intents and purposes,
the case was closed. The decision not to report the assault witnessed
and reported by McQueary is a key issue in the criminal prosecution of
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier for failure to report, endangering the
welfare of a child, obstructing administration of law, and criminal
conspiracy. The three men attempted to shield themselves and their
inaction by the euphemistic language. For example, when asked in
court if there was a conversation about whether to go to law
enforcement, Curley responded, "At the time I don't recall that
because, again, I didn't feel—at least I didn't feel personally that any
criminal activity had occurred" (DC, p. 199). Likewise, Schultz offered
similar reasoning for failure to refer the case to the police. He said,
"My recollection was that he [McQueary] was uncomfortable they were
in the shower and it was just the two of them [Sandusky and the boy]
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and that they were horsing around and inappropriate conduct." Schultz
concluded, "There was no indication that it was [criminal]" (DC, p.
231).
The extent of ethical fading enabled by euphemism in the case
can be seen in how Curley defended himself and his decisions. When
pushed to explain why an act that he did not view as criminal was
reported to The Second Mile, Curley stated, "based on what I heard
that was reported to me, I just didn't feel it was appropriate that Jerry
would be in a shower area with a young person. Whether it was
horsing around or however you want to describe it. I just didn't think
that would be appropriate and shouldn't occur" (DC, p. 200). He
defended his entire course of action, drawing from the same
euphemism:
I was not aware of anything sexual. So I didn't feel that it
warranted that [police investigation] and I felt my actions were
appropriate. But I was not aware that there was sexual activity.
[Q: If you didn't think this was sexual in nature or criminal in
nature, then why did you take the action of barring Sandusky
from bringing youths onto the university property?] Because I
didn't think it was appropriate that he would be using our
facilities, having young people in there in the evening, and that
you're in a shower area horsing around with a young person.
(DC, p. 197)
Paterno, too, defended his inaction by recounting to his biographer
that if McQueary had told him he saw Sandusky raping a young boy,
"We would have gone to the police right then and there, no questions
asked" (Posnanski, 2012, p. 277).
Despite their protestations that they would have done the right
thing if they had only known the truth, the bitter tragedy here is that
all these men appear to have known that it was more than "horsing
around." Paterno, Curley, Schultz, and Spanier were well aware of the
1998 case where Sandusky had been reported to the police for
showering with and inappropriately touching a young boy. Although no
criminal charges were pressed in that case, a 95-page police report
was filed and red flags were raised. At the time of McQueary's report,
Schultz contacted police chief Tom Harmon to check on the records of
that case (FR, Exhibit 5D). Schultz immediately contacted the
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university's outside legal counsel, Wendell Courtney, to have a
conference on "reporting of suspected child abuse" (FR, p. 69, Exhibit
5A). They hid files in their offices. They communicated in coded
language in their emails. But over time, as the case grew colder,
ethical concerns faded even further from view. Through euphemism,
the leaders found ways to justify their actions and inactions, ways to
justify their interpretation. Tragically, between February 2001 when
the crime was first reported to when the criminal charges were
launched and Sandusky was arrested, at least two more boys were
assaulted by Sandusky in the Penn State locker room and another four
boys at locations off of Penn State's campus. Sandusky may have
stopped taking "guests" to the showers, but it did not stop his criminal
behavior.2

Discussion
By situating language in a central position in our analysis, we
demonstrate that the specific words people use are of utmost
consequence for ethical action (see Bisel et al., 2011; MacKenzie,
2000; Redding, 1996). The findings of this study provide evidence of
the central role euphemism played in a decade-long cover-up of the
sexual abuse scandal at Penn State University. We described how
euphemistic language was used to shield an eye-witness from personal
embarrassment and emotional discomfort when reporting what he
saw, and then how euphemisms were co-opted by top leaders to
justify a chain of (in)action that protected them from the rational
discomfort provoked by legal risks and moral obligations of responding
to sexual abuse charges. In short, euphemism was used to protect
Penn State's personnel and the organization at large—even though it
came at the expense of leaving boys in harm's way.
Although reporting of abuse followed a proper internal chain of
command—with the glaring omission of filing a police report—there
was a serious and significant breakdown in communication whereby
the essence of the message was lost and/or (perhaps willfully)
distorted. In particular, the euphemism "horsing around" played a
pivotal role in how the case unfolded over time. From the very
beginning, McQueary spoke in face-saving, euphemistic terms as he
reported the assault he had witnessed to Paterno. Even though it was
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understood at the time that the action was "inappropriate" and likely
sexual, there was much ambiguity in the words used. The ambiguity
was reflected in Paterno's confusion over what happened, as he
testified in court that it was "fondling, whatever you might call it" and
then recounted to his biographer that he understood McQueary's
report to be that Sandusky and the boy were "horsing around."
Paterno, highly uncomfortable with discussing the taboo topic, relayed
McQueary's report to Curley and Schultz, who in turn reported it to
Spanier.
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier then co-opted the "horsing around"
euphemism with dire consequence. They framed the official
organizational response around an innocuous—yet patently false—
interpretation that Sandusky simply showered with a boy after hours
and engaged in "horseplay." Certainly horseplay is inappropriate and
could pose undue risks to the university: someone could get hurt (e.g.,
slip and fall on the wet floor) and an adult being alone in a shower
with an underage male could open up the risk for (false) allegations of
improper conduct. Consequently, leaders' ensuing use of euphemisms
such as "appropriate use of facilities" and "guests" framed their
concern around risk management for the university and abuse of Penn
State's facilities, not the sexual abuse of a boy.
But it is patently obvious that the boy with Sandusky was not a
guest. He was a victim of sexual assault on Penn State's campus by a
person who, although no longer technically employed by the
university, still retained official affiliation. By acknowledging the boy in
this scenario as a victim instead of a euphemistic "guest"—
interchangeable with any other person who might enter the football
facilities—the criminality of the case is foregrounded and ethical and
legal obligations of the university can no longer be faded from view.
Penn State leaders had an immediate, pressing, and non-negotiable
duty to respond. The laws in the state of Pennsylvania required that
they report the suspected abuse of a minor to the police. Penn State
University policies required them to identify the victim, provide
support services, and be an advocate for the victim. Additionally,
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier were required to cooperate with
subpoenas and other police investigations; to cooperate with external
child welfare organizations and their independent investigations; and
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to testify in court to what they knew. Most importantly, they had a
duty—if not legally, at least morally—to act swiftly to ensure that the
child was clear of immediate harm and to take decisive actions to
prevent any future harm. Yet none of these things occurred. Emails
were sent, meetings were held, attorneys were consulted, and one
month after the initial report, Curley simply asked Sandusky in a
private meeting not to bring underage guests for workouts and
showers—a banal and euphemistic request enforceable only by the
honor system.
Yes, the silence and cover-up of the abuse committed by
Sandusky was scandalous. But so, too, was Penn State leaders' use of
euphemism. In fact, euphemism may have done even more damage
than silence. Silence quashed proper criminal investigation and, at
least for a while, protected the university from bad publicity and
shielded leaders from public scrutiny (Freeh, 2012). But the use of
euphemism appears to have silenced the quiet voices, too—those
voices of conscience that sit on the shoulders of people who could
have spoken up, who could have stopped the abuse sooner. By
reframing the meaning of the initial report into something more
palatable, euphemism silenced the voices that said "this behavior is
criminal." By encouraging mindless decision-making, it silenced the
voices that asked "are we doing the right thing for all parties
involved?" and "what are the ethical implications of our choices?" By
providing a psychological shield for wrongdoing, it silenced the voices
that whispered at night "it's not too late to speak up." In short, it was
euphemism that enabled leaders to act unethically and to deceive
themselves that they had behaved appropriately.
Moreover, we argue that euphemism—whether as a deliberate
or emergent discursive move (see Moldoveanu, 2009)—acted as a
disguised retort to critical upward communication. While retorts
typically are characterized as sharp or angry responses, the
euphemism "horsing around" operated much differently. Rather than
responding to subordinates' accusations of sexual abuse with outright
denials, threats or reprimands to subordinates, or attempts to recruit
subordinates into a deliberate cover-up, euphemism was a calm and
quiet response that silenced dissent by creating an illusion of care and
concern. Specifically, Penn State leaders were able to listen to
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McQueary, acknowledge their "shared understanding," and assure him
they were working to fix the problem. Put another way, euphemism
was a systematically distorted communication that enabled leaders to
"listen to, act on, and speak about" something (i.e., stopping
boisterous play) without having to listen to, speak about, and act on
the high-stakes, ethically-laden something (i.e., criminal sexual
conduct perpetrated against minors). Therefore, they created a
reasonable belief that McQueary's expression of critical upward
communication was well-received. As such, there was no apparent
need on McQueary's part to pursue further internal dissent or whistleblowing (Baron, 2013; Gutierrez & McLaren, 2012; Kassing, 2011),
thereby halting any further critical upward communication.

Contributions and Future Directions
In this study, we heeded MacKenzie's (2000) call to place
language at the center of the study of organizational ethics. In addition
to the insights we offered into understanding more fully the role that
communication played in the Penn State sexual abuse scandal, we
have made contributions to euphemism research more broadly. The
core contributions center on organizational euphemism, which remains
a largely understudied topic (see Stein, 1998). For each contribution,
we identify a set of questions to shape future research directions.
First, we demonstrate some of the unique effects of
organizational euphemism, particularly with regard to organizational
ethics. Previous research has shown that euphemism use can impair
ethical decision-making by framing an issue in more palatable terms,
by encouraging mindless processing, and by providing a shield against
psychological discomfort and material consequences. This case
analysis provides a vivid example of those processes. Taken to an
organizational level, however, there are additional effects to consider.
Most notably, while euphemism may begin as a substitute term, it
easily can be transformed into a metaphor for guiding organizational
thought and action (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Vignone, 2012).
Operating as a metaphor, then, organizational euphemism can extend
its power by shaping meaning of related phenomena. In this particular
case, not only was sexual abuse hidden, but the victim was rebranded
as an unauthorized guest, culpability was shifted to Sandusky and the
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victim as equal agents in wrongdoing, and the university was
positioned as the true victim of facility abuse. Consequently, not only
did moral considerations of the real issue fade from view, but attention
shifted toward a different problem—one that could ethically justify the
course of action being taken (i.e., "professional blind spots," see
Weick, 1995, p. 113). Future research can address several questions
in this regard. What is the connection between euphemism and
metaphor across organizations? How might metaphor conceal and
reveal moral considerations? What effect does euphemistic and
metaphorical language have on organizational members' ability to
process ethical considerations?
Second, we provide preliminary insights into the process by
which euphemism moves from an interpersonal to an organizational
level. To begin, while it is unclear exactly who introduced the
euphemism "horsing around," it appears it was by one of the top
leaders (i.e., Paterno, Curley, Schultz, Spanier), who each had
legitimate power due his position in the university. Whether "horsing
around" was a deliberate discursive move from the start or simply
emerged, the euphemism gained traction through leaders' willing
acceptance of the phrase (i.e., no evidence exists that its meaning or
its appropriateness ever was questioned). From there, the euphemism
was repeated in internal conversations, recorded into written records
of the organization, and relayed to external audiences by public
figures.
But more than mere repetition of responding euphemisms, the
process hinged upon compatibility with the earliest reporting
euphemisms in this case. That is, the feasibility of using "horsing
around" to chart organizational action depended upon earlier
ambiguity (e.g., McQueary's use of "over the line," "with a boy").
Indeed, had McQueary's report to Paterno contained explicit language
(e.g., "I witnessed Sandusky raping a young boy"), the transformation
of "horsing around" from interpersonal to organizational euphemism
would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. Top leaders
were able to draw upon a vocabulary of "horsing around" to make
sense of and develop a more palatable narrative of the accusations
against Sandusky (see Rorty, 1989; Weick et al., 2005). This insight
into the process raises questions for future research. What other
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processes are involved in establishing an organizational euphemism?
Why do some euphemisms persist and others fall out of favor? Would
organizational members with less power possess the same ability to
introduce an organizational euphemism?
Third, organizational euphemism can become embedded into
institutional memory (Linde, 1999) and provoke individuals to accept
decisions made and/or set precedent for how to respond to similar
events in the future. For instance, given the propensity for
organizational record-keeping—particularly, but not exclusively, in
large organizations—organizational euphemisms are likely to become
part of the written record of the organization. In this way, euphemism
can serve as an official record against which actions can be defended
to various stakeholders. For instance, leaders can draw upon
euphemism to justify their course of action to stakeholders, providing
an account that bleaches ethical considerations from decisiontriggering events. Similarly, after original decision-makers have left an
organization or if enough time has lapsed to cloud individual memory,
written documents can serve as an official record of what occurred.
When records are imbued with euphemisms, individuals accessing
those internal documents may take contents at face value without
additional interrogation of the ethics of a particular decision. This type
of record-keeping can have far-reaching implications, such as leading
to plausible deniability on the part of upper-level decision makers (see
Eisenberg, 1984; Seeger & Ulmer, 2003). Researchers should address
further the connection between euphemism and institutional memory.
What are the processes by which written and oral accounts of ethical
decisions get embedded into institutional memory? What role do
organizational records play in setting precedent for future ethical
deliberation? How might written records be analyzed to evaluate
ethical decision-making?
Finally, our findings provide evidence of how euphemism can
function as a disguised retort to critical upward communication (see
Kassing, 2011; Morrison, 2011; Tourish & Robson, 2006). There are a
range of motivations as to why someone would engage in the risky
behavior of expressing critical upward communication—from simply
following protocol, to clearing his or her conscience, to seeking
resolution to a perceived problem. Particularly in the case of the latter,
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an individual likely will be looking for assurances that the situation has
been resolved (or at least an absence of information indicating that the
situation remains unresolved). Direct retorts such as denials of the
truth of claims (e.g., "That can't possibly be true") or soliciting
cooperation in a cover-up (e.g., "We count on you to keep this matter
between us, right?") would be strong signals of resistance to the
critical upward communication, which could incite further action on the
part of the messenger (e.g., going to a higher level in the
organization, whistle-blowing to an external audience; see Baron,
2013; Gutierrez & McLaren, 2012). In contrast, using a shared and
uncontested euphemism allows leadership to present itself as being
appropriately concerned and responsive to the situation. Just as the
absence of critical upward communication contributes to leaders'
inaccurate perceptions of the communication climate in an
organization (Tourish & Robson, 2006), employees can be led to a
similar conclusion. Leaders do not have to deny or silence concerns by
stopping the subordinate from talking; they can collaboratively deny
and/or silence those concerns by attending to a preferred, innocuous
meaning. This approach prevents organizational members from
persisting in critical upward communication as it appears the situation
is being addressed. Future research should examine the connections
between euphemism and critical upward communication. What is the
relationship between euphemism and silence? How might
organizational actors learn to spot when they are being silenced by
euphemism? What role has euphemism played in other organizational
scandals or whistle-blowing cases? How does euphemism as a retort
impact decision making in organizations?

Practical Implications
There are several practical implications of the present study.
Most importantly, we highlight the critical need for specific language
and a cultural script for discussing sexual assaults, particularly those
involving male sexual assault. The emotional uneasiness and loss for
words throughout the Penn State case provides evidence of Capers'
(2011) assertion that male sexual assault is "invisible, or at least unarticulable" (p. 1259). Perhaps none of these men knew how to put
into words what they knew. More than a decade after the crime was
witnessed, and far removed from the locker room where it occurred,
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McQueary still was embarrassed and struggling to verbalize what he
saw. This observation is in no way made to justify leaders' claims of
ignorance and organizational (in)action. However, it seems plausible
that if McQueary had witnessed Sandusky in the same position with a
female (especially an adult woman), he may have had words to
describe what he had seen, as typical sexual scripts and rape scripts
position perpetrators as male and victims as female (Crome & McCabe,
2001). Perhaps he would have even had the courage to confront
Sandusky in the moment as he relied on a common gendered cultural
script of "saving a damsel in distress" (Phelan, Sanchez, & Broccoli,
2010). Given that naming a problem is a necessary step in identifying
and responding to it, a new vocabulary—one that is devoid of sanitized
clinical or legal descriptions of assault, taboo talk of body parts, and
"feminized" sexual assault language—may prove helpful in breaking
the silence on male sexual assault. As one example, some sexual
assault survivors already are beginning to post online about their
experiences of being "sanduskied" as a way to draw attention to
problems of male sexual assault and silence.
Turning to business contexts, people must be sensitized to the
potential dangers of euphemism and encouraged to use clear and
precise language across various organizational contexts. Particularly in
situations that may carry legal ramifications, euphemistic language
must be abandoned in favor of specificity. Whether it is sexual assault,
sexual harassment, discrimination, insider trading, improper
accounting practices, or the like, organizational members have an
ethical responsibility to speak as clearly as possible. This means that
individuals need to find the courage to put aside personal
embarrassment and discomfort when reporting wrongdoing (Jablin,
2006).
Euphemism poses even bigger challenges for ethical leadership.
Leaders have an additional ethical responsibility to seek clarity. When
euphemism or other ambiguous language is used, leaders cannot allow
assumptions of shared meaning to suffice no matter how
uncomfortable the topic. Leaders must be held accountable for asking
tough questions and getting detailed information. They must learn how
to handle difficult conversations by giving individuals permission (if not
a mandate) to speak in clear, unequivocal terms—even at the expense
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of being offensive or using dysphemisms (i.e., impolite, offensive, or
disagreeable terms). They should not halt difficult conversations for
the sake of relieving their own or other's discomfort. Not only could
they be missing important information in the exchange, but the
information that they learn from these conversations may not meet
legal standards for specificity. Moreover, leaders carry an ethical
burden to foster a culture where clear, unequivocal language is
encouraged (see Seeger & Ulmer, 2003).
Finally, this case provides a moment to reflect upon how
language and ethics are taught in university settings. Given the
important role that education plays in socializing future leaders to the
business world and establishing their tolerance for unethical behaviors
(see Yu & Zhang, 2006), it is worth a reappraisal of how students are
being taught to talk. What type of language is rewarded? What type is
penalized? Moreover, in an era of political correctness and litigationsensitivity, are euphemism and niceties encouraged, either implicitly
or explicitly, while clearer but potentially more offensive words are
discouraged? It would seem that professionalism and tact can be
taught in such a way as to promote clarity and avoid obfuscation.
Furthermore, ethics classes could include units on analyzing language
use to uncover and address ethical issues that may not be readily
apparent at first glance.

Conclusion
When Sandusky's charges of sexual abuse were brought to light,
the media and public at large implored, "Why didn't anyone speak up?"
The truth is that they were speaking. It was not the silence that was
damaging in this case, but the words—the euphemistic words—that
enabled the most harm. The Penn State sexual abuse scandal stands
as testament to the dangerous, injurious, and violent effects that
language can have. While euphemism is not inherently bad, it can
serve less-than-noble purposes, particularly when it is used to signify
problems rife with ethical concerns and hide unpleasant truths that
should not be concealed. Stein (1998) warns that the trouble with
euphemisms is that "we usually recognize—awaken from—them after
they have done their damage" (p. 1; see also Redding, 1996). Such is
the case with the Penn State sexual abuse scandal. There, the
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expression "horsing around" was not a neutral word choice that merely
privileged polite talk. It was euphemism that enabled unethical
decision-making by distorting meaning, impeding and misdirecting
efforts at corrective and preventative action, providing a cover of
ambiguity to shield administrators from psychological discomfort and
legal liability, and silencing critical upward communication. Ultimately,
the inability or unwillingness of key leaders to speak clearly about
accusations of sexual abuse had dire consequences for the university,
its leaders, and, most significantly, the boys who were sexually abused
for years after McQueary's report. In retrospect, it is easy to see the
extent of the harm condoned, exacerbated, and inflicted by leaders'
euphemistic language choices. The tragedy of the Penn State sexual
abuse case should serve as an urgent and far-reaching wakeup call to
pay much closer and more critical attention in everyday life to the
power and consequences of language.
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Notes
1 One of the striking elements of the courtroom testimony was the
precise language invoked throughout—ranging from sanitized to
graphic. In their questioning of witnesses, attorneys used terms
like "sexual conduct," "body positioning," "body movement,"
"Mr. Sandusky's genitals touching the boy," "erect penis,"
"insertion," and "thrusting his groin into a young boy's rear
end." Some terms were used to present testimony as matter-of-
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factly as possible; others for dramatic effect. However, it seems
most probable that the language used to describe the assaults
outside the court room was far less precise and somewhere
between the two extremes of sanitized and graphic.
2 As a postscript to the case, Sandusky attempted to use the "horsing
around" euphemism as a defense for his actions. When
questioned by Bob Costas in an NBC interview, Sandusky
defended himself against McQueary's accusations by saying,
"Okay. We were showering and horsing around and he [the boy]
actually turned all the showers on and was actually sliding
across the floor and we were, as I recall, possibly like snapping
a towel and horseplay" (Costas, 2011). Of course, the
euphemism that could sound innocent on the surface takes on a
much more insidious meaning when taking into consideration
that Victim 4 testified in criminal proceedings that Sandusky
would call play fighting and throwing soap suds in the shower,
often which occurred as a precursor to a sexual assault,
"horsing around" (CC3, p. 53).
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